Names are predicates. This claim can mean different things to different people. Willard V. Quine thought that names were predicates in the sense that they were to be represented as general terms in translations of English sentences into the language of first-order logic. 1 Clarence Sloat thought that "proper nouns" were predicates in the sense that, like common count nouns, they must occur either as a bare plural or with a determiner (such as 'the', 'some', and 'a'), although that determiner could in some cases go unpronounced (Sloat 1969). 2 Tyler Burge thought that "proper names" were predicates in the sense that they were true or false of things and should be treated as general terms in a semantic theory of English. 3 While I agree with all of these claims, when I say that names are predicates I mean that they have a predicate-type semantic value, whatever that might turn out to be. The semantic value of a predicate might be extensional: for example, the set of entities of which the predicate is true (an extension); or that function from entities to truth values (a type-e, t function) which assigns TRUTH to all such entities and FALSITY to everything else. Or it might be intensional: for example, a property; or a function from possible worlds to extensions (Lewis 1986); or a function from possible worlds to type-e, t functions. (All of these sets and functions might be relativized to a domain, if need be.) The question of which of these types might be a semantic value of a predicate is independent of the question of whether names are predicates. If names are predicates, then whichever of the above semantic types that can be a value of the predicate 'planet' can also be a value of the name 'Aristotle' and vice versa.
Names Are Count Nouns
Predicativists about names are moved by examples of the following sort. 4 (1) There is one Alfred in Princeton (based on Burge (1973) ).
(2) Every Sarah I've met sometimes works as a babysitter.
(3) Sarahs from Alaska are usually scary.
In these sentences, names occur as a complement to a quantificational or a numeric determiner or as a bare plural. In each case, we have a name occurring in a position reserved for count nouns like 'hunter' and 'bear'. Just as we can count how many hunters or bears there are in Princeton or Alaska, we can count how many Alfreds or Sarahs there are in Princeton or Alaska. Just as we can make generalizations about hunters or bears from Alaska, we can make generalizations about Sarahs from Alaska.
Frege thought that names have descriptive, predicative conditions "associated" with them (Frege 1892) . Despite this, Frege-like Mill before him and Kripke after him, as well as most subsequent semanticists-thought that names were not predicates but referring expressions, by which I mean expressions with an individual as semantic value, i.e., expressions of type e . 5, 6, 7 To emphasize the diversity of the views which I'm rejecting, I'll sometimes call the view that names are referring expressions rather than predicates the Frege-Kripke view of names.
If the Frege-Kripke view of names were uniformly correct, then names could only ever occur in the argument positions of predicates. Accordingly, in the sentence 'Mars is Venus', the verb 'is' here would have to be a relation expression that has two argument positions; Frege assumed it stood for identity.
Frege (and Russell, and surely Kripke) admitted, though, in addition to the 'is' of identity, an 'is' of predication. Russell thought it "a disgrace to the human race that it has chosen to employ the same word for these two entirely different ideas" (Russell 1919, p. 172) . The 'is' of predication is a copula. It connects subject to predicate. The 'is' of identity is a relation expression. It relates subject to object. If names are predicates, then it is open that the verb 'is' in 'Mars is Venus' is a copula, hence that 'Mars is Venus' shares a semantic structure with 'Mars is celestial '. 4 See for example Tyler Burge (1973) , Jennifer Hornsby (1976) , Reinaldo Elugardo (2002) , Paul Elbourne (2005) , Sarah Sawyer (2010) , and Nick Kroll (no date) [more citations]. Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal (1995) don't explicitly adopt the predicate view, but they find it an attractive alternative to orthodoxy. Segal (2001) later reconsiders but (sort of) rejects it.
One predicativist, Ora Matushansky (2005 Matushansky ( , 2006 Matushansky ( , 2008 , has not been motivated by examples like (1)-(3) per se. She is motivated by independent syntactic considerations but considers it confirmation of predicativism that it predicts that examples like (1)-(3) will be grammatical.
Quine's predicativism was motivated by ontological considerations about true negative existential claims. He thought that since 'Pegasus does not exist' is true, the name Pegasus must be a predicate rather than a referring expression. For since the sentence is true, the name 'Pegasus' does not have a referent. The sentence is true, he thought, because the name 'Pegasus' is a predicate with an empty extension.
5 Cite Frege, Concept and Object? 6 Mill used the terminology "name" to include what we now call predicates as well as what we now call names. He used the phrase "general names" for the former and "individual or singular names" for the latter. 7 See .
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We will have to address the question of what the semantic structure of 'Mars is Venus' could be if the 'is' here is a relation expression, since the proper name 'Venus' would in that case be in an argument position rather than a predicate position. It wouldn't do to argue that there is no 'is' of identity since the name 'Venus' can in general show up in the argument positions of predicates, as in 'Frege looked at Venus' or 'Venus is Mars'. My view is that names are predicates in all of their occurrenceswhether that appear in predicate position or in argument position. In all of their occurrences, they have a predicate-type semantic value.
Tyler Burge provided some examples in which it is uncontroversial that names are predicates. Here are two of his examples (1973, 429) : (4) An Alfred who joined the club today was a baboon.
(5) Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane.
The proper names in these sentences occur in positions reserved for count nouns: in the first case, in the singular, as a complement to the indefinite article; and in the second case, in the plural. 8 The following examples show that singular occurrences of names do not naturally occur in positions reserved for mass nouns:
(6) a. There is not much water in Princeton; b. * There is not much Alfred in Princeton. 
Names may be Contextually Restricted
Burge did not remark on the fact names as predicates are subject to the phenomenon known as quantifier-domain restriction. The phenomenon of quantifier-domain restriction involving common nouns is illustrated by the pair of sentences in (8). The phenomenon of quantifier-domain restriction involving names is illustrated by the pair in (9) (8) a. Every adult is having a good time; b. Every adult at the party is having a good time.
(9) a. Only a few Davids are having a good time;
b. Only a few Davids at the party are having a good time.
An utterance of (8a) will typically take place at a time when there are some adults in the world who are not having a good time. That typically does not suffice to make the utterance false. An utterance of (8a) may have the truth conditions represented in (8b). Similarly, an utterance of (9a) will typically take place at a time when there 8 In (4), Burge has a definite description where I have the indefinite description. I make the change because 'Alfred' in 'the Alfred' is not in a position reserved for count nouns. Mass nouns can also occur in a singular definite description: as in 'the furniture they bought for the club today'.
Delia Fara: NAP Last modified: "Wednesday, 16 Jan 13, 23:27" are more than a few Davids in the world who are having a good time. That typically does not suffice to make the utterance false. An utterance of (9a) may have the truth conditions represented in (9b). Quantified noun phrases can have restricted domains when they have proper names in their nominal component just as they can when they have common nouns in their nominal component.
Terminology
Before I proceed further, I need to lay out my use of terminology. The phrases needing clarification are: 'name', 'proper name', 'proper noun', and 'common noun'. The use of these phrases has not been consistent in the literature on this topic, so I want to clarify my usage in order to pre-empt misunderstanding. It should suffice to give some indication of my use of these terms rather than any explicit definition.
A name: All names are nouns but not vice versa. For the time being, we will otherwise leave the notion of a name at an intuitive level. It would be nice to say that names are those expressions that are used to refer to individuals. But that would not do, since other expressions can also be used to refer to individuals. Donnellan showed us that definite descriptions can be used to refer to individuals (Donnellan 1966 )-remember 'the man drinking a martini' (Donnellan 1966) . And George Wilson later showed us that indefinite descriptions can be used to refer to individuals (Wilson 1978 )-remember 'a convicted embezzler is trying to seduce your sister'. By the end, though, we will have a concrete criterion for being a name.
Proper name: When philosophers talk about "proper names," they usually mean a name that denotes a certain type of individual, for example, a person, a pet, a country, or a planet. That list is not exhaustive. Names of companies, e.g., 'Polaroid', are considered to be proper names. But quote-names of words, such as the name of the word 'philosophy' (' 'philosophy' '), are not considered to be proper names. How do we decide which sorts of individuals are the ones whose names are proper names? Rather than leave this at an intuitive level, I will stipulate that a proper name is a name that begins with a capital letter.
Common noun: As I will use the term, no name is a common noun, and common nouns include both mass nouns and count nouns.
Proper noun:
A proper noun is a noun that starts with a capital letter.
It may be helpful to set out some examples in a chart.
Delia Fara: NAP Band-Aid (the company) Manhattan (the island) Coca-Cola (the company) May (the month) Prozac (the drug) fluoxetine (Prozac) bel hooks (the author) 007 (the secret agent)
spring (the season) 'philosophy' (the word) philosophy (the branch of study)
philosophy (a belief system) (count noun)
band-aid (an adhesive bandage) (count noun)
One feature of this classification is that whether a name or a noun is classified as proper depends only on its orthography and is therefore a matter of convention, not semantics or grammar.
Another feature of the classification is that whether a word or phrase is classified under any of the headings can vary with use. A word or phrase may be used as a name on one occasion but not on another. What makes Abbott and Costello's "Who's on First" sketch funny is that Costello uses 'Who' as a name (for the guy on first) while Abbott just uses the word as an interrogative pronoun.
Similarly, whether a noun is classified as count or mass can vary with use. The noun 'student' is typically used as a count noun. But when we think of students as forming an undifferentiated mass, we can use the noun as a mass noun: "There was so much student in the quad that I couldn't hear myself think." In Jeffrey Pelletier's words, I have put the students in the quad through the "universal grinder" (Pelletier 1975, 457) . This is the first of two analogies that we will make between the mass/count distinction among nouns on the one hand and the name/common-noun distinction among count nouns on the other hand.
Names are Multiply Applicable Predicates that are True of their Bearers
There's no controverting Burge's view that names occur at least sometimes as predicates with multiple application. In these cases they are predicates that are true of Delia Fara: NAP (BCC) 'N' (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called N.
I claim that in every case where a name occurs in a position that's obviously occupiable by a common noun, it is a predicate with (potentially) multiple application. The condition of its application is given by the being-called condition (BCC). 9 The being-called condition was just expressed as a schema. We write down an instance of that schema by writing it down with both occurrences of its schematic letter 'N' replaced by a word of the indicated category. In this case, it is names that are in the indicated category. Here, then, are some instances of the schema: (11) 'Socrates' (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called Socrates;
(12) 'Tyler' (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called Tyler; (13) 'David' (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called David.
The being-called condition is to be distinguished from a different but related condition, which I call the bastardized being-called condition, expressed as a universal quantification. 10 (BBCC) For every name N, N (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called N.
Here, the letter 'N' is not a schematic letter but rather an individual-level variable bound by a first-order universal quantifier. To make this more perspicuous, we might use a lowercase letter instead of an uppercase one as our variable:
(BBCC ) For every name x, x (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called x.
We write down an instance of this universal quantification by deleting the restricted quantifier 'for every name x' and replacing the remaining occurrences of the variable 'x' with a word standing for a thing in the indicated domain of quantification. In this case, the indicated domain is the domain of names; the words that stand for things in that domain are names of names. These, then, are instances of the bastardized being-called condition. One difference between the two conditions is obvious: an instance of the bastardized being-called condition can contain only a quoted name after the past participle 'called'; while an instance of the being-called condition proper may contain an unquoted name after 'called'. (For ease of exposition, I pretend that putting a name in quotes is the only way to form a name for it. 11 ) A related difference between the two is that the passive phrase 'is called' in the bastardized condition is followed by an individual-level variable and must therefore be a relation expression with at least two arguments: a subject (that which is called something) and an object (what the subject is called). Meanwhile, the past participle 'called' in the being-called condition proper is followed not by an individual-level variable, but rather by a schematic letter which is to be replaced by a name, which may in turn be unquoted. On my view these names are predicates. So on my view the passive verb phrase 'is called' is being treated not as a relation expression but rather more like a copula-like 'turned' in 'he was turned green (by the witch)'. If this view of 'called' is correct then the bastardized being-called condition is ungrammatical since it would have an individual-level variable occurring in a predicative position. It would be like writing 'x was turned y (by the witch)'.
On the flip side, if a 'called' predication could be true only if 'called' were followed by a quote-name-as in 'Socrates was called 'Socrates' '-then no instance of the being-called condition proper would be true. From the perspective of a proponent of the Frege-Kripke view of names, instances of the being-called condition proper are roughly incoherent. On their view, to say that Obama is called Barack is not to say that Obama has a certain name, but rather that Obama is called a certain person-himself.
Names Are Used as Predicates in the Being-Called Condition
We had said (schematically) that a name 'N', when a predicate, is a predicate that is true of a thing just in case that thing is called N. We called this the being-called condition. Using double-bracket notation to represent the function from a predicate to its extension, we state the being-called condition (schematically) as follows: In 'Walter drunk himself silly', 'himself silly' is arguably a small clause with a reflexive pronoun in subject position. 'Called' is not the only verb to take a small-clause complement.
(19) Walter drunk himself silly small clause . 13 The claim here is that in 'My parents called me Delia', 'me Delia' is a small clause. 14 The pronoun 'me' occurs in its subject position and the name 'Delia' occurs in its predicate position. Ora Matushansky (2005 Matushansky ( , 2008 has supported the latter claim by pointing out the following: If appellative 'call' were a verb that allowed for two objects-as it would have to if the bastardized being-called condition were grammatical-then it should be passivizable in both of its object positions. But it is not. Contrast the active-passive counterparts in (21) with those in (22) and (23). 15 The paradigm double-object verb 'give' is passivizable in both of its object arguments. By appellative 'call' I mean the verb that we use when we say that someone has called someone something. 16 I contrast this with "telephone 'call' " which is the verb that we use when we say that someone telephone-called someone or that someone telephone-called something for someone. 17 I use "appellative 'call' " to include the calling that we normally describe as calling someone names. In the everyday sense, if I've called you stupid and lazy then I've called you names. So that is a use of appellative 'call'. Unlike appellative 'call', telephone-'call' is passivizable in any of its object positions. Have you heard the old joke about calling a cab?
HOWLETT: Choate, will you call me a cab? CHOATE: OK, you're a cab.
The joke plays on the the homonymy of the two 'call's. Howlett's request is that a cab be summoned for him by Choate. If Choate had called Howlett a cab in that sense, then we could say, in the passive voice, both (25b), that Howlett was called a cab by Choate and (25c), that a cab was called for Howlett by Choate. But given what Choate in fact did, namely, say to Howlett that he is a cab, the passive voice allows us only to say the former, (25b): that Howlett was called a cab by Choate.
In other words, if Choate had done what Howlett wanted him to do, then all of (25a-c) would have come to be true. But given what Choate in fact did, (25c) did not come to be true; only (25a-b) did. When we say that Choate called Howlett a cab, then the indefinite description 'a cab' is in the direct-object position of a double-object verb if we're using telephone 'called'. But if we're using appellative 'called', then the description 'a cab' is in the predicate position of a small clause. Thus passivizability from the direct-object position of telephone-'called' distinguishes the two.
Names Appearing in Argument Position Are Embedded in Denuded Definite

Descriptions
Names do not always appear in predicate position. They also appear in the singular in argument positions: as subjects; direct objects; indirect objects; and objects of prepositions. The Frege-Kripke view that names have individuals as their semantic values is a natural one in light of commonplace examples like these. Frege's view in "Sense and Reference" was that the "Bedeutung" (i.e., semantic value) of 'Venus' is an individual, and the Bedeutung of the unsaturated predicate ' is celestial' is a function which when supplied with an individual as argument yields THE TRUE or THE FALSE as a value. In other words, the semantic value of 'Venus' is an entity on Frege's view and the semantic value of ' is celestial' is a function of type e, t . The sentence (26) is true since the semantic value of ' is celestial' yields THE TRUE when applied to the entity Venus, the semantic value of 'Venus'. This is a pleasingly simple semantic analysis of subject-predicate sentences with names as subjects.
Simplicity is indeed a virtue, but there is no straightforwardly simple way to extend the Frege-Kripke view of names to names in predicate position. More than one well-known philosopher of language has said to me that it would be misguided to try. Names in predicate position, they say, are clearly used differently from names in argument position; in predicate position a name N is a "meta-linguistic" predicate, true of just those things that have N as a name. The suggestion is that predicative names can simply be set aside as requiring no more discussion than that.
Delia Fara: NAP Last modified: "Wednesday, 16 Jan 13, 23:27" I take a different approach. I do not think we should set aside names in predicate position as ubiquitous deviants. We would do best to try to develop a unified theory of names in predicate positions and names in argument positions. Moreover, I take this approach from the opposite direction. I begin with an account of names appearing in predicate position. Subsequently, I develop that account so that it extends to names appearing in argument positions. I take the analysis of names as multiply applicable predicates as a starting point and proceed from there. The question facing us now, then, is this: If names are predicates, not referring expressions; not, that is, expressions with an individual as a semantic value; not, that is, expressions of type e; then how could a name compose with a predicate to yield a truth value? How could two type-e, t functions compose at all? Neither type is in the domain of the other.
According to the theory I'll maintain, when a bare singular name appears in argument position, it is the predicative component of a denuded definite description, by which I mean a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. 18 What appears on the surface as (30) is underlyingly really (31). 'Ø the ' is the unpronounced definite article. On my view, therefore, the compositional semantics and the syntactic form of sentences containing names will be special cases of sentences containing other descriptions, numerical phrases, quantified noun phrases, complex demonstratives, or bare plurals. Whatever syntactic form the (a) sentences below have, the (b) sentences have that form as well. However the elements of the (a) sentences formally compose to yield a proposition or truth value, the corresponding elements of the (b) sentences formally compose in that way too. (41) a. If Joe buys a horse and rides it, then his donkeys will be upset and kick the horse as often as they can.
b. ? If Joe meets a Secretariat and marries her, then his parents will be upset and insult Ø the Secretariat as often as they can. 19 In each case, I take it that the semantic types of the expressions in the (b) sentences will be the same as those of the corresponding expressions in the (a) sentences. Since the common nouns in the (a) sentences all have predicate-type semantic values, the names in the (b) sentences all do as well. The truth values of, and the propositions expressed by, the (b) sentences will therefore be determined in the same compositional way as those of the (a) sentences.
Because my view of the syntax and compositional semantics of names is parasitic on the syntax and semantics of other count nouns, I do not need to provide detailed investigation or elaboration of their syntax and compositional semantics in order to present my view. In general I entitle myself to say here just that the syntax and compositional semantics of names piggybacks on those of other count nouns. But let me clarify two points.
First, in saying that the syntax of names piggybacks on that of common nouns, I do not mean to say that there is no syntactic difference between names and common nouns. There must be some syntactic difference between them. Otherwise we wouldn't have 'the' being permitted to occur before the noun in 'the man is on the road' but prohibited (in English) from occurring before the name in 'Pierre is on the road'. I mean rather to be making conditional claims like the following: if the bareplural construction in 'bears are scary' contains a syntactically real but unpronounced generic operator, then so does the bare-plural construction in 'Sarahs are scary'; if the semantic value of 'bears' in 'bears are scary' is the set of all sums of individual bears, then the semantic value of 'Sarah' in 'Sarahs are scary' is the set of all sums of individual Sarahs. 20 Second, in saying that the compositional semantics of names piggybacks on that of common nouns, I mean only to say that names and common nouns have the same type of semantic value, not that they have the same conditions of application. The truth conditions of sentences containing the one are compositionally determined in just the same way as those containing the other. For example, as I said at the outset, I would take names to have the same predicate-type semantic value that other common nouns have, whatever that might be. If common nouns are best treated as having an extensional semantic value-such as a function from entities to truth valuesthen so are names. Alternatively, if common nouns are best treated as having an intensional semantic value-such as a function from possible worlds to extensionsthen so are names. Piggybacking does not, in contrast, require that names and other common nouns have the very same application conditions. We saw this is the last section. The view that the name 'Michael' applies to a thing just in case it is called Michael does not entail that the noun 'sage' applies to a thing just in case it is called a sage. You can call me a sage; that does not make me one. Here's a perfectly analogous claim. The view that the predicate 'man' applies to a thing just in case it is an adult male human does not entail the view that 'tiger' applies to a thing just in case it is an adult male human. 21 We return to this last point in §10.
Burge said 'that'
Burge advocated a version of the being-called condition for predicative names: "A proper name is (literally) true of an object just in case that object is given the name in an appropriate way" (1973, 430) . This invites the question: Appropriate for what? I presume that Burge intended to rule out cases in which you're given a name without that name becoming a name of yours. For example, in order to preserve anonymity, the doctors gave their patient the name 'Linda'. But the patient was not given the name 'Linda' in the appropriate way, in Burge's sense, because the name did not thereby become a name of hers. So although Burge's criterion does not overtly involve the notion of being called something, I consider it to be a version of the being-called condition since in my view for a thing to be called N just is for it to be given the name 'N' in such a way that it becomes a name of its.
Since Burge accepted (his own version of) the being-called condition for all occurrences of names-those appearing in argument position as well as those appearing in predicate position-he also faced the problem of how to give a compositional semantics for names in argument position. But whereas we proposed that a name appearing in argument position constitutes the matrix of a denuded definite description, Burge proposed that a name appearing in argument position constitutes the matrix of a denuded complex demonstrative. Whereas we proposed that 'Maria is tall' was to be interpreted as 'Ø the Maria is tall', Burge proposed that it is to be interpreted as 'Ø that Maria is tall'. 22 Let's call the two views 'the' predicativism and 'that' predicativism. The two versions of predicativism are closely allied, but the definite-description version explains, as we'll see in section 9, certain linguistic facts that make it irresistible and in any case, far superior to its complex-demonstrative cousin. 21 Elbourne makes similar remarks [page numbers]. 22 I should mention that Burge did not frame his analysis in quite these terms. Burge never made explicit mention of an unpronounced 'that'. Rather, he spoke of names that appear in argument position as "involv[ing] a demonstrative element" (432).
Delia Fara: NAP Last modified: "Wednesday, 16 Jan 13, 23:27" Burge's own direct argument for 'that'-predicativism is compressed. Let me quote it in full:
Evidence for the view that proper names in singular unmodified form involve a demonstrative element emerges when one compares sentences involving such names with sentences involving demonstratives. Apart from speaker-reference or special context, both Jim is 6 feet tall and That book is green are incompletely interpreted-they lack truth value. The user of the sentences must pick out a particular (e.g., a particular Jim or book) if the sentences are to be judged true or false. It is this conventional reliance on extrasentential action or context to pick out a particular which signals the demonstrative element in both sentences.
There is an important point here which must be extracted in order to understand Burge's argument. Sentences involving names, whether or not names are predicates, do not have a truth value independently of context. For example, a brutely applied disquotational truth clause for the sentence 'Jim is 6 feet tall' is not true. It is not true to say that 'Jim is 6 feet tall' is true just in case Jim is 6 feet tall any more than it is true for me to say that 'I am hungry' is true just in case I am hungry. Your utterance of the sentence may be true even if I am not hungry. Similarly, this is wrong: 'Jim is 6 feet tall' is true just case Jim is 6 feet tall. If when I utter this biconditional I am saying anything at all, then in using 'Jim' on the right-hand side I must use it to refer to some particular Jim. But when you utter the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side, if you are to make any claim at all, then you must refer to some particular Jim. But they needn't be the same Jim. The Jim I refer to is 6 feet tall. But the Jim you refer to is less than 6 feet tall. The two truth clauses must be context dependent:
(42) 'I am hungry' is true in a context just in case the speaker in that context is hungry;
(43) 'Jim is 6 feet tall' is true in a context just in case there is a Jim referred to in that context and that Jim is 6 feet tall.
By now, we have all learned from Kripke's "semantic argument" that when we do refer to some Jim on an occasion, using the name 'Jim', this cannot always be a result of our having some particular substantive description of Jim that applies to him and no-one else. Jim might well not satisfy the description. We may refer to him nevertheless. Nor need we believe, as Kripke also pointed out, that we have some uniquely identifying substantive description of him. I don't believe that I have any substantive uniquely identifying description of either Cicero the Roman orator or of Richard Feynman the physicist.
Burge concludes that since we can succeed in saying something about a particular Jim, even though there are many Jims, the particular Jim that we're talking about must have been demonstrated in some way. Since Burge is concerned to develop a unified semantics of names as predicates, he needs a name in argument position to be Delia Fara: NAP Last modified: "Wednesday, 16 Jan 13, 23:27" embedded within some phrase that can appear in argument position-where the rest of that phrase goes unpronounced. Complex demonstratives are such expressions, so he plumps for 'that', having already rejected 'the', for reasons to be discussed in a later section.
Some Arguments against 'That'
Some opponents of Burge's view object to it because they object to the being-called condition. 23 Others object to it because they object to a null 'that'. I'll consider three such arguments: a pragmatic one and a syntactic one, both due to Jeffrey King (2006a) , and a semantic one due to James Higginbotham (1988) .
A Pragmatic Argument
King argued against Burge's null 'that' by contrasting the following pair:
(44) That Glenn Bunting is happy but this one isn't; (45) * Glenn Bunting is happy but this one isn't. (King 2006a, 149) If Burge were correct about 'that', the argument goes, then there should be no difference in acceptability between these two sentences; but the first is acceptable and the second is not.
The defender of Burge has a decisive response. Outside of the context of a dialog, a contrastive claim usually requires there to be two stressed words or phrases between which the contrast is to hold. 24 And of course, you cannot stress a word or phrase without pronouncing it.
If we use capitals to represent stress and relative size to represent relative stress, then what we really have is a contrast between these pairs: (44 ) THAT Glenn Bunting is happy but THIS one isn't; (45 ) * Ø that Glenn Bunting is happy but THIS one isn't. 25 These sentences do not differ just by having a pronounced 'that' where the other one has a null 'that'. They also differ in the location of their stress. To see that this affects acceptability, compare the following two sentences, which differ only in the location of their stress:
(46) Grandma WANTED you to go to the store, but now she NEEDS you to go to the store; (47) * Grandma WANTED you to go to the store, but now she needs you to go to the STORE; 23 See Stephen Boër (1975 25 One who refers to King's argument as "pragmatic" pretends or assumes that constraints on intonation are not part of the grammar of English. This is probably not true for English any more that it is true for Chinese.
Just as contrasting the content of two words or phrases usually requires some stress on each of them, we also have the converse. A stress on each of two words or phrases usually requires a contrast in content between them. Together these two facts explain the difference in acceptability between (46) and (47). There is a contrast in content between wanting and needing but not between wanting and a store. So since King's argument depends on more than just a difference between pronounced 'that' and null 'that', Burge defenders are free to reject it.
A Syntactic Argument
King also observes that an overt appearance of 'that' affects grammaticality. He points to a contrast like that between (48) and (49) and takes this contrast to disconfirm 'that'-predicativism. He writes:
The count noun 'dog ' [in (49) ] cannot be used to designate a particular dog. So here the advocate of the predicate view of names has to hold that names qua count nouns exhibit exceptional behavior not exhibited by other count nouns. Plainly, names do not exhibit the same behavior as other count nouns. But that is not a strike against 'that'-predicativism. For consider an analogous argument against the view that mass terms are nouns.
The mass term 'dust' in (51) cannot be used to designate the kind of thing that can be counted. So the advocate of the view that mass terms are nouns has to hold that mass terms qua nouns exhibit exceptional behavior not exhibited by other nouns. Why isn't this a good argument against the noun-hood of mass terms? Because there is more than one kind of noun. There are mass nouns and count nouns, among others. Nouns are not all alike in all respects. Some nouns can be used to count the things that they apply to; others cannot.
Similarly, nouns are not all syntactically alike. A mass term cannot complement the indefinite article. (Witness: 'I vacuumed up a dust this morning'.) A count noun can. If one is to maintain that mass terms are nouns despite their syntactic and semantic differences from count nouns, then one must have an independent criterion for being a noun and show that mass terms satisfy that criterion.
Likewise, if one is to maintain that names are count nouns, then one must have a criterion for being a count noun and show that names satisfy that criterion. Things are better if we can also make some predictive generalizations about the syntactic differences between names and common count nouns. In the case of mass terms we can make a number of syntactic generalizations. Mass terms cannot complement the determiners 'a' or 'every'; they cannot occur in the plural; they cannot complement 'how many', but they can complement 'how much'. 26 . We will see that in the case of names, as a species of count noun, 'the'-predicativists can make correspondingly predictive generalizations. We will make good on that claim in §9.
A Semantic Argument
Higginbotham's (1988) semantic argument against 'that'-predicativism is closely related to King's pragmatic argument. But whereas King argued for a difference in the acceptability of sentences containing names with or without 'that', Higginbotham argues for a difference in truth conditions between such sentences. He contrasts the truth conditions of utterances of (53) and (52), when made in the same situation as each other (1988, 36) . Here's the scenario. You and I are now eating in a seafood restaurant. We have a sister called Mary. Our sister is not with us. And she is not nearby. But there is a woman who just left the restaurant. We've never met her but we both know that her name is 'Mary'. (She's wearing a name tag.) Higginbotham observes that an utterance of (52) would be true just in case our sister Mary had fish for lunch; meanwhile, an utterance (53) would be true just in case the unknown Mary had fish for lunch.
But on Burge's behalf we could rehearse a variation of the response that we gave to King's pragmatic argument. We could say that a demonstrative-name complex has the same semantics whether or not the demonstrative is pronounced, but pronunciation of the demonstrative effects different pragmatic constraints on which thing can be the object of the demonstration. Here's a toy theory that could be played with to develop a serious pragmatic theory of Higginbotham's contrast. A pronunciation of 'that' requires a demonstrated object to be in the vicinity of the conversation, but an unpronounced 'that' does not have this strict requirement. An unpronounced 'that' allows the speaker more discretion to pick out something as long as that thing is sufficiently well-known among conversational participants and also sufficiently salient.
So Burge has quality responses to the above arguments of King and Higginbotham per se. But the pairs (44-45) and (52-53), which they rely on to make their arguments, should catch our eye. Each pair displays that a demonstrative can, but need not, be pronounced before a name occurring by itself. This implies that we have a choice about whether to pronounce it. So if the demonstrative which occurs grammatically in 'That John is kind' and the one that does in 'Ø that John is kind' have the same meaning, then the difference between them must be pragmatic, since it is not syntactic. A defender of Burge's predicativism is required to provide a serious account of this pragmatic difference.
That said, I do not reject 'that'-predicativism because I think that King's or Higginbotham's arguments against it are successful. I do not think that they are. I reject 'that'-predicativism because 'the'-predicativism is better motivated and allows for a more satisfying overall picture of names as predicates. And consider finally (56) (56) a. This is the/that John I mentioned yesterday. b. * This is John I mentioned yesterday.
If there is a hidden determiner in (54a) and (56b), it is evident that there are some special rules governing when it can appear on the surface and when it cannot.
['The'-predicativism] stands in serious need of a well-motivated account of these rules. (2001, 561) Indeed. Segal here challenges the 'the'-predicativist to explain the data in (54)-(56) in light of her two views that (i) names are a species of count noun and that (ii) bare singular names appearing in argument position complement an unpronounced 'the'. 27 To meet this challenge, we will have to provide explanations of the kind mentioned in response to King's syntactic argument against a null 'that' in the middle of the last section. These were (A) there must be an independent criterion for being a count noun and (B) we should be able to make some predictive generalizations about the syntactic differences between names and other count nouns. We can meet both of these challenges.
(A) For x to be a count noun is for x to be a noun that applies to things that can be grammatically counted using x itself. 28 For example, 'dust' is not a count noun since we cannot grammatically count in this way: one dust, two dusts, three dusts, . . . ; 'cat' is a count noun since we can grammatically count in this way: one cat, two cats, . . . . Names pass this test easily. Just as we can count the number of cats in my house using the noun 'cat', we can count the number of Johns in my department using the noun 'John': one John, two Johns, . . . . 27 Segal attributes the argument to Higginbotham (1988 And if names are count nouns, they should also fail tests for being mass nouns. And they do.
(57) * How much Michael do you live with?
(58) A Michael that I know was here yesterday.
(59) Two Michaels that I know were here yesterday.
(60) Michaels usually have conventional parents.
(61) Every Michael shares a name with a biblical angel.
(B)
We can also make predictive generalizations about the syntactic differences between names and other count nouns. Clarence Sloat had already provided such a generalization (Sloat 1969 ). We will provide a slight amendment to Sloat's generalization about the distribution of determiners with names and other count nouns. Then we will formulate a syntactic hypothesis that accounts for it.
Sloat laid out a chart comparing the distribution of determiners with phrases containing common count nouns with the distribution of those same determiners with a name put in for the common noun. He considers (i) the indefinite article, (ii) 'sm', which is the unstressed 'some' that occurs with plurals and mass nouns, (iii) 'sóme', which is the 'some' that is typically well-represented by the existential quantifier, (iv) bare plurals, and (v) the definite article. I have added to his chart some rows for the demonstrative 'that'. Asterisks indicate unacceptable sentences; question marks indicate marginally acceptable sentences. (Sloat 1969, 27) A man stopped by.
The Sloat chart
A Smith stopped by. * Sm man stopped by.
* Sm Smith stopped by. Sóme man stopped by.
Sóme Smith stopped by. Sm men stopped by.
Sm Smiths stopped by. Sóme men stopped by.
Sóme Smiths stopped by. Men must breathe.
Smiths must breathe. The clever man stopped by.
The clever Smith stopped by. The man who is clever stopped by.
The Smith who is clever stopped by. A clever man stopped by.
A clever Smith stopped by. The men stopped by.
The Smiths stopped by. The man stopped by.
* The Smith stopped by. * Man stopped by.
Smith stopped by.
That clever man stopped by. That clever Smith stopped by.
?? That man who is clever stopped by. ?? That Smith who is clever stopped by. * That men stopped by. * That Smiths stopped by. That man stopped by.
That Smith stopped by.
Note that 'the' is distinguished as the only one of the determiners here that differs in its distribution with names as compared to common count nouns. That is, the following are the only two rows of the table in which there is a difference in acceptability between the left column and the right column.
Delia Fara: NAP The only difference between determiner plus name and determiner plus common count noun is that 'the' must not appear before an unmodified name in the singular but it must appear before an unmodified common count noun in the singular. 29 Sloat proposes that the simplest explanation is that the definite article has a "zero allomporph" (what we've been calling null 'the') and must appear as such before a name in the singular, except when it is stressed or when the name is preceded by a restrictive adjective or followed by a restrictive relative clause (28). These display the relevant cases: He judges that in (66) 'young' is unambiguously nonrestrictive (like 'brave' is when we say, "Brave Philip slew the dragon"). He also judges that in (67) 'young' is unambiguously restrictive (like 'younger' is when we say "The younger Philip slew the dragon"). From this Sloat infers that in the general case, nonrestrictive prenominal adjectives prohibit pronunciation of 'the' before a name. But we should not draw general inferences from examples (66) and (67) since not all adjectives behave like 'young' in this respect.
In the two examples below, the adjectives may be (though they need not be) interpreted nonrestrictively:
(68) The ever-popular Marc Jacobs won yet another design award.
(69) The talented Mr. Ripley was a terrific impersonator.
So some but not all adjectives occurring before a name permit null 'the' when they are interpreted nonrestrictively. It is an open question how to demarcate which adjectives those are but in any case, in section 9, I will make the opposite generalization from the one that Sloat did. I propose that non-restrictive adjectives that precede a name force the definite article to be phonologically realized as 'the'. Sloat's sentence (66) shows that there are exceptions to this generalization. However, not all adjectives are exceptions to this generalization. Comparative and superlative adjectives clearly are not exceptions to the rule: Moreover, those adjectives that are exceptions to the rule (e.g., 'young' and 'brave') do also allow overt 'the' while being interpreted non-restrictively. 'Young' and 'brave' can be interpreted non-restrictively in the following:
(72) The brave William never shed a tear; (73) The young Harry followed in his brother's footsteps.
So while I agree with Sloat's judgement that 'young' in (66) is unambiguously nonrestrictive, I disagree with his judgement that 'young' in (67) is unambiguously nonrestrictive.
Whether one agrees with Sloat's judgement or with mine, however, does not dictate whether one should favor 'the'-predicativism. Where 'the'-predicativists disagree about judgements such as these, they will have to offer different accounts of the rules that govern where the definite article must be overt or null. Neither needs, therefore, to reject 'the'-predicativism based on his judgements about (66) or (67).
Where 'The' Must Be Null
The proposal now on the table is that names always occur in predicate position. When one appears not to be in predicate position, it is because it is embedded in a denuded definite description. The rule governing the stripping of overt 'the', as garnered from the last section, is this: The definite article appears as Ø the when it occurs with a name, except in the following cases, where it appears overtly as 'the': (i) the definite article is stressed;
(ii) the name is preceded by a restrictive or nonrestrictive modifier; or (iii) the name is followed by a restrictive modifier.
'Adjective' and 'relative clause' have here been replaced with the more inclusive term 'modifier' in order to ensure that cases like the following are included without controversy:
(74) The always-in-your-face Peter went too far this time;
(75) The Ivan on the roof is howling.
Sloat says that (76), below, is "clearly associated with" the sentence 'John, who is the butcher, lives on our street ' (1969, 27) . This allows him to subsume the stripping of 'the' in this case under his nonrestrictive relative-clause rule. But if we replace 'relative clause' with 'modifier', then we need not have a relative-clause analysis of modifiers in apposition in order to explain why the definite article appears as Ø the in the following sentence.
(76) John, the butcher, lives on our street.
The question now arises whether we can dispense with our disjunctive version of the generalization concerning null 'the' in English and provide a more unified generalization of the rule. It turns out that one clearly emerges when we look at the syntactic structures associated with the cases subsumed under the rule. First we look at simplified syntactic structures where the definite article is required to be overt. Next we look at simplified structures where the definite article is required to be null. There is a general principle that covers all cases where the definite article must be realized as Ø the , namely, whenever it has a name as its sister. Put another way, the overt definite article cannot form a constituent with just a name. 30, 31 Where 'the': The overt definite article cannot have a name as its sister.
Preceded by a Restrictive Modifier
So what, now, is our analysis of the difference between the interaction of names with the definite article and that of common count nouns and the definite article.
The man stopped by. * The Smith stopped by. * Man stopped by.
The difference displayed here can be derived from the following principles, the second and third of which have been justified in this section.
1. Singular count nouns cannot occur bare in an argument position, but must rather be embedded in the predicate position of some larger determiner phrase.
2. Names are count nouns.
3.
The definite article must must be null just when it has a singular name as its sister.
30 I thank Paul Elbourne for this latter statement of the generalization. 31 I have made the controversial assumption that the nonrestrictive relative clause in (81) is a sister of the determiner phrase rather than embedded in it. To the extent that this allows for a smooth generalization about overt and null 'the' I take that as evidence for that analysis of this nonrestrictive relative. Other analyses of this construction would require a different generalization about null 'the'. [Say something about Ora's generalization.]
Circularity Is no Problem for the Being-Called Condition
It seems to some that the being-called condition is circular. Presumably, that means that it gives no condition for being in the extension of a name other than being in the extension of that name. That criticism of the being-called condition would be correct if being called N were nothing more than being in the extension of 'N'. But the criticism is not correct. 'Called' as it is used in the being-called condition does not stand for a relation of the kind that appears in disquotational semantic clauses, such as reference, predicate-application, and truth. Predicativist proponents of the being-called condition do not think that to be called N just is for 'N' to apply to you. (And referentialist proponents of the being-called condition, such as Kneale, do not think that to be called N just is to be the referent of 'N'. 32 ) Rather, proponents of the being-called condition think that being called Jane, for example, is a substantive condition of application for the name 'Jane'. To say that something is in the extension of 'Jane' just in case it's called Jane is not to say something tautologous. When the unidentified, unconscious woman is wheeled into the emergency room and is subsequently given the name 'Jane Doe', she does not thereby come to be called Jane. The hospital staff uses the name 'Jane Doe' to refer to her, i.e., to talk about her, but she does not thereby come to be called Jane Doe. 33 If you were to count the unidentified patient when counting the number of Janes in the emergency room, then you would most likely have made a mistake.
Let me bring these points home with a discussion of Kripke's criticism of Kneale's advocacy of the being-called condition. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke lambasted Kneale's argument for the being-called condition. He presents Kneale's argument by quoting the following passage.
While it may be informative to tell a man that the most famous Greek philosopher was called Socrates, it is obviously trifling to tell him that Socrates was called Socrates; and the reason is simply that he cannot understand your use of the word "Socrates" at the beginning of your statement unless he already knows that it means "the individual called Socrates". 34 (Kneale 1962, 630) Kripke chides Kneale for violating an obvious non-circularity condition. 32 A clarificatory note: A referentialist as well as a predicativist can accept the being-called condition. Kneale and Bach are referentialist BCCers because they think that the individual Socrates is the semantic value of the name 'Socrates' while thinking that the name 'Socrates' means the individual called Socrates. I, in contrast, am a predicativist BCCer because I think that the name 'Socrates' is a predicate with an extension as its semantic value while thinking that the extension of the name 'Socrates' is the set of individuals called Socrates.
33 Kent Bach makes a similar point:
In fact, however, bearing a name is not the same property as being referred to by that name. For example, it was one thing for Giorgio Barbarelli to be given the name 'Giorgione' (because of his size) and another thing for him to be referred to by that name. (2002, 83) Bach's point, though, isn't exactly the same as the one about 'Jane', since when Bach says that Barbarelli is "referred to" by the name 'Giorgione' he means that Barbarelli is the referent of the name 'Giorgione'. But the point about the name 'Jane Doe' was that the hospital staff can talk about the unidentified patient using the name 'Jane', but that doesn't suffice to put the patient in the extension of the name 'Jane' nor, as the referentialist should put it, does it suffice to make her the referent of the name 'Jane'. You can refer to (i.e., talk about) anything using any word you like. You can refer to yourself in the third person by saying, "Idiot, stop doing that!" That does not suffice to put you in the extension of 'idiot' nor, as a referentialist should say, does it suffice to make you the referent of the word 'Idiot' used as a name. 34 Let me point out that for the sake of accuracy, I have copied down Kneale's passage exactly as it appears in his text. But wherever he puts double quotes around the name 'Socrates', my typesetting convention would require single quotes since I use single quotes to form the name of a word.
Delia Fara: NAP But these statements, according to Kripke, count no more as good meaning analyses than do the statements that 'Socrates' refers to the thing referred to by 'Socrates' or in general, that something is in the extension of F just in case it is in the extension of F. But Kripke's declaration is correct only if being called something is a semantic relation of a piece with being the referent of a word or being in the extension of a predicate or being the condition of truth for a declarative sentence. In the sense in which Kripke uses the word 'call', to say that Saul is called 'Saul' is to say just that 'Saul' refers to the person that 'Saul' refers to.
But this is not what Kneale had in mind. Rather, he intended the being called relation to be a relation that holds because of social practices that lead to people's having the names that they do have. 35 On the one hand, when we say, "Kripke is called Saul," using the BCC sense of 'call', we mean that 'Saul' is a name of Kripke's. On the other hand, when we say, "Kripke is called Saul," using Kripke's sense of 'call', we mean that Kripke is the referent of the name 'Saul'.
[In this section cite Bart Geurts, (maybe Kent), and John Justice ''The Semantics of Rigid Designation' '.] For example, Kripke is called Saul, in the BCC sense, because 'Saul' is the name that was put on his birth certificate by someone who had the legal or social authority to do so. But there are also other ways to acquire a name. Let's pretend that Socrates was not called Socrates during his own time, but rather Alcibiador. The man then called Alcibiador is nevertheless now called Socrates because enough people in the academic community, for a sufficiently long period of time, have uniformly used the name 'Socrates' to refer to Socrates. In other words, one can acquire a certain name when prolonged and widespread usage of it catches on and sticks. And this is not the sense in which any word in a language can come to have the meaning that it does when prolonged and widespread usage of it with that meaning catches on and sticks. Rather, it is the very same sense of coming to have a name as the sense in 35 Kent Bach similarly argues that Kripke's circularity objection turns on an equivocation on the meaning of 'is called' (Bach 2002, 83-84). which Cassius Clay came to be called Muhammad Ali by declaring it so. It took a very long time for the predicate 'arthritis' to come to have the meaning that it in fact has, and it took a very long time (let's assume) for Socrates to come to be called Socrates, but it might have happened very quickly-just like it took mere moments for Cassius Clay to fall under the predicate 'Muhammad Ali', that is, to come to be called Muhammad Ali.
This that 'called' in the being-called condition is not a semantic relation used to express disquotational meaning facts. It expresses a relation the holding of which is specific to the analysis of names. Return now to the point made at the end of the preceding section. There we said that the view that the predicate 'man' applies to a thing just in case it is an adult male human does not entail the view that 'tiger' applies to a thing just in case it is an adult male human. In light of the above discussion, the relevance of that point is that 'called' in the being-called condition is not a semantic relation used to express disquotational meaning facts. It expresses a relation the holding of which is specific to the analysis of names. Look at it this way. Being an adult male human is a non-circular condition for being in the extension of the predicate 'man'. Calling your son a man does not make him a man. Being an adult male human is what makes him a man. Analogously, being called Stefan is a non-circular condition for being in the extension of the predicate 'Stefan'. So while you don't make your newborn son a man by calling him a man, you do make him a Stefan by calling him Stefan. Why? Because as his parent, you have the power to give him a name. But, even though you are his parent, you do not have the power to make the newborn a man before his time.
In the BCC sense, whether or not someone is called a man has nothing to do with whether he is in the extension of the predicate 'man'. In the same sense, though, calling your son Stefan does make him a Stefan. If you call your son Stefan, then he has been given the name 'Stefan' in an appropriate way-the name thereby becomes a name of his. Since that is the condition for being in the extension of 'Stefan', he thereby comes to be a Stefan.
In the light of all this it's worth making a certain point against Kripke that would elsewhere seem just a quibble. In Naming and Necessity, the passage from Kneale is not typed up exactly as it appears in Kneale's paper. In Kneale's paper, the final occurrence of 'Socrates' does not show up in quotes; it is used rather than mentioned. In Naming and Necessity, however, the final occurrence of 'Socrates' does show up in quotes; it is mentioned rather than used. It is tempting to put this down just to a transcriber's or typesetter's error. But it cannot be just that. Without the quotes around the final occurrence of 'Socrates', Kripke would not be able to make his point against Kneale. Kneale's analysis is circular only if the name 'Socrates' is mentioned in its own analysans.
I want to make another point against Kripke that is almost a quibble, but it's a point I like to make in any case. It is not trifling to be told that horses are called 'horses'. It's not trifling because it is not even true! To say that horses are called 'horses' is to make a generalization of the same form as 'horses are beautiful'. But while horses in general are beautiful, horses in general are not called 'horses', not, at least, in the BCC sense. I've given one of my cats the name 'Cats'. But I would not Delia Fara: NAP Last modified: "Wednesday, 16 Jan 13, 23:27" be surprised to learn that I were the only one who ever gave a cat the name 'Cats'. I would be equally unsurprised to learn that no horse had ever been given the name 'Horses'. 
